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1I define postmodernism as incredulity towards meta-narratives.
Jean-Francois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition
When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of the 
future and know the present will you understand it.
Friedrich Nietzsche, "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life"
1. Introduction1
Nietzsche is commonly invoked as a prophet of the postmodern.  Both 
sympathizers and critics of the postmodern share this invocation. Thus Habermas, in his 
widely debated The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity, in which he takes a decidedly 
critical view of postmodernism, tells us
Nietzsche appeals to experiences of self-disclosure of a decentered subjectivity, 
liberated from all constraints of cognitive and purposive activity, all imperatives 
of utility and morality.  A "break-up" of the principle of individuation becomes 
the escape route from modernity. Habermas [1987], p. 94.                     
Nietzsche's perspectivism, his suspicion of metaphysics (ultimate ontology), his radical 
skepticism and interrogation of conventional notions of truth, have been taken to mark 
him as an agent of dissolution, of polyphony, a practitioner of the hermeneutics of 
suspicion.2  Nietzsche is cited as a model of deconstruction; for instance, his genealogical 
endeavors are held-up as a paradigm of disclosing the origin in opposites, the unmasking 
of a facade of unity that hides a congery of mixed motives.  Thus Michel Haar 
approvingly quotes Nietzsche as saying "We are a plurality that has imagined itself a 
unity" [Allison, 1985, p.18].  In this vein the name of Nietzsche travels in the company of 
                                                
1 Quotations from Nietzsche make use of the following abbreviations, 'UM' for The 
Untimely Meditations, 'HAH' for Human, All too Human, 'GS' for The Gay Science, 'TSZ' 
for Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 'BGE' for Beyond Good and Evil, 'GM' for On the 
Genealogy of Morals , 'EH' for Ecce Homo, 'TI' for Twilight of the Idols', 'A' for The 
Antichrist, 'WP' for The Will to Power, 'KSA'  for Sämtliche Werke: Kritische 
Studienausgabe and 'SB' Sämtliche Briefe: Kritische Studienausgabe. Full bibliographic 
references for these works are given at then end of this essay.
2 In fact Ricouer coined the phrase “hermeneutics of suspicion” principally to describe 
modernists such as Freud and Marx who claim that the apparent order disguises a deeper 
more causally fundamental order of meaning; thus Freud’s distinction between the 
manifest and latent content of dreams.  Such modernists are suspicious of the apparent 
order but do not reject the notion of meaning altogether. In this sense Nietzsche may 
rightly be counted as a practitioner of the hermeneutics of suspicion. However for 
postmodernists the notion of a hermeneutics of suspicion stands for a suspicion of all 
levels of meaning.
2Barthes, De Man, Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida. 3   Thus Hillis Miller cites Nietzsche as 
perhaps "the most systematic and cogent" of "all modern deconstructers of the idea of 
selfhood" [Hillis Miller, 1981, p. 248 - emphasis mine].
Yet Nietzsche was careful to describe himself as an affirmative spirit, one who 
says Yes and Yes again to Life, an opponent of Nihilism, a would-be architect of the 
future.  In this affirmative mode Nietzsche typically stresses the importance of finding a 
unitary voice, of finding a means to retell history as a pathway to one's own constructed 
self.  
What is meant is that a people to whom one attributes a culture has to be a single 
living unity and not fall wretchedly apart into inner and outer, content and form.  
He who wants to promote the culture of a people should strive for and promote 
this higher unity.  [UM, II, 4] 
How then are we to reconcile Lyotard's incredulity of meta-narratives with its resultant 
polyphony of voices, and Habermas's characterization of Nietzsche as offering a break-up 
of the principle of individuation, with Nietzsche's insistence that we must learn to 
appropriate the past, construct a unifying goal and interpret the past in the light of that 
goal?  
In the following essay I will focus on the architectural metaphor of self-
construction, in particular as it occurs in Nietzsche's essay "On the Use and Abuse of 
History for Life", in arguing for the claim that postmodern readings of Nietzsche 
typically misunderstand Nietzsche's various attacks on dogmatic philosophy as paving 
the way for acceptance of a self, a world, characterized by fundamental disunity. The 
architectural metaphoric is particularly helpful because Nietzsche, as we shall see below, 
explicitly uses it to contrast the idea of a centered construction with that of a building of 
mere pieces jumbled together. Nietzsche applies these architectural tropes both to 
individuals and cultures and they embody a mode of thought that runs throughout his 
corpus, though, as we shall see, it undergoes various vicissitudes. Examining Nietzsche's 
architectural metaphoric is of particular interest since theorists of postmodern architecture 
are among some of the most prominent of those many postmodernists who take Nietzsche 
to be a prophet of disunity. Nietzsche's use of architectural metaphoric to emphasize the 
                                                
3  For instance, see chapter 1 of Alan Schrift's Nietzsche's French Legacy. Shrift says
The whole Nietzschean project of genealogy directs itself toward deconstructing 
the foundations of the dominant values of modernity  (p.24)…. In dispersing the 
subject within a system of textual relations, Derrida adopts a Nietzschean strategy 
of refusing to hypostasize the subject ( p. 30).
I should pause here to note that while writers sympathetic to Derrida such as Shrift, and 
writers unsympathetic to Derrida such as Habermas, take Derrida to valorize the 
dispersion of the subject, Derrida’s texts are fairly subtle on this point.  Indeed Derrida’s 
texts often suggest an awareness of the fact that while Nietzsche argues that modern 
subjectivity is multiple and dispersed Nietzsche leaves open the possibility of the 
construction a new unified subjectivity.
3notion of unity as a goal belies Nietzsche's adoption by theorists of postmodern 
architecture as a disciple of an anti-essentialist decentered pluralism.   In contrast to the 
postmodern reading it will be argued here that Nietzsche's attack on essentialist dogmatic 
metaphysics is in fact a call to engage in a purposive self creation under a unifying will, a 
will that possesses the strength to reinterpret history as a pathway to the problem that we 
are.  Nietzsche agrees with the postmodernists that unity is not a pre-given, but where he 
parts from them is in their complete rejection of unity as a goal.  On the descriptive side, 
Nietzsche and the postmodernists agree that the received notion of the unified Cartesian 
subject is a myth, however on the prescriptive side, where the postmodernists typically 
celebrate the death of the subject, Nietzsche rejects this valorization of disunity as a form 
of nihilism and prescribes the creation of a genuine unified subjectivity to those few 
capable, and hence worthy, of such a goal.  The de-centered self celebrated by the 
postmodernists is for Nietzsche the self-conception of the nihilistic Last Man. The 
construction of a unified self is the goal of Nietzsche's Overman.  It will be argued here 
that to the extent postmodernists happily embrace the role of ironic epigones they are 
nearer Nietzsche's conception of the Last Man than his idea of the Overman.  Robert 
Pippen has nicely summed up the difference between the modernist and postmodernist 
reaction to the perceived loss of a pre-given unity as follows
Whereas in modernism, the typical modern experience that ‘all that is solid melts 
into air,’ or ‘the center does not hold,’ had prompted the creation of a ‘subjective 
center,’ an autonomous self-defining artist, for post-modernism there is no 
[possible] center at all. [Pippen, (1991), p. 156]
Given this way of drawing the modernist/postmodernist distinction it is here argued that 
Nietzsche falls on the modernist side.
2. The Rejection of Dogma
The postmodernists and critics of postmodernism who cite Nietzsche as attacking 
the notion of the singular subject, the unified self, are of course well supported by textual 
evidence. Thus we have Nietzsche's famous dictum from the Genealogy "the doer is 
merely a fiction added to the deed" [GM, I, 13], his observation in Beyond Good and Evil
[BGE 26] "our body is but a social structure composed of many souls" and the note from 
the 1885 Nachlass which reads "My hypothesis: the subject as multiplicity" [KSA, 11, 
650, note 490 in The Will to Power].
Much of the work of the first essay of the Genealogy centers on the claim that the slave's 
reality principle - his realization that he can not directly attain his desires - has led to a 
repression of those very desires - the desires for the very qualities and successes of the 
envied and hated masters.  This repression leads to a splitting-off, which renders those 
desires incapable of direct expression and conscious access.  On this model we moderns, 
as descendants of the slaves, have become, in Nietzsche's memorable expression 
"strangers to ourselves" [EH, Preface, 1].  Our deepest desires and convictions are hidden 
4from us.
However, note that the claim that there is no doer behind the deed need not be 
taken as a blanket rejection of the notion of a doer.  Rather the point of emphasis can be 
placed on the notion of a doer behind the deed. For the Christian there is behind the deed 
an immutable soul. It is this notion of a free choosing soul that is being rejected here, thus 
immediately before saying "the doer is merely a fiction added to the deed" Nietzsche says 
"there is no such substratum". For Nietzsche the doer is literally in the deeds.4 Below it 
will be argued that for Nietzsche not every collection of deeds performed by a single 
body amounts to a doer.  The right to say 'I', like the right to make promises (more on 
which soon) is in Nietzsche's view, an achievement vouchsafed to a precious few. More 
generally, Nietzsche, against the Christian and Cartesian tradition, takes things to be 
defined by their relational, rather than any intrinsic, properties.  Thus his dictum that a 
thing is the sum of its effects and his continuous valorization of becoming over being.5
While what is directly at stake in Nietzsche's attacks on the notion of a unified, 
self-transparent Cartesian I, are the very presumptions of unity and self-transparency, his 
underlying theme is often a replacement notion of unity as a goal.  The Cartesian claims 
to know first and foremost the existence and nature of the I, posing the construction of 
the external world as a problem.  Reversing this formula Nietzsche problematizes the 
existence and nature of this I.  Yet in problematizing the I Nietzsche is not seeking 
primarily to expose some kind of metaphysical error.  For such a gesture would still fall 
under the dominion of the Christian inspired will to truth.  In offering a critique of the 
notion of a unified self, as in his critique of the Christian world-view that assumes this 
notion of self, Nietzsche is not primarily aiming to expose a deception, a metaphysical 
error. As he says of Christianity, "it is not error as error that horrifies me at this sight 
[EH, "Why I am A Destiny", 7].  That the notion of the unified self is a deception; this in 
itself matters only to those with a morality, which shuns all forms of deception.  For 
Nietzsche the desire to escape all deception is another form of the ascetic ideal [cf. GM 
III, 25].  Deception for Nietzsche is an inevitable part of life, thus "[u]ltimately the point 
                                                
4  The claim that doer is in the deeds amounts to the claim that the doer is no more than 
the collection of his deeds.  This claim has a similar motivation to Hume’s claim that a 
person is no more than the collection of their sensations.  Both Hume’s and Nietzsche’s 
problematic reconstructions of selfhood are predicated on their common rejection of 
attempts to give the I, selfhood, some transcendental grounding.
5  Note, the claim that things, in particular people, are defined by their relational rather 
than their intrinsic properties is perfectly consistent with the claim that their relational 
properties are to some extent determined by their categorical, intrinsic, properties.  The 
categorical properties provide the basic potentialities that are a major, but not full,
determinant of what a thing does, hence what a thing is.  If one took the view that certain 
intrinsic, essential properties define who a person is then one no longer has available the 
space to argue that Nietzsche through his texts hopes to help certain individuals become 
what they are capable of becoming.  After all, Nietzsche’s texts cannot change his readers 
essence, but at most can help them realize some of the potentialities allowed by that 
essence.
5is to what end a lie is told". [A, 56].  The problem with the notion of the Cartesian self, 
the Christian soul, is that it is part of a slandering, a poisoning of life.  It slanders life in 
that it suggests that our being and worth is not to be found in how we act, what we 
achieve, in this world, but in a supposed pre-given transcendental essence which is 
distinct from the natural world of material being.
The notion of a transparent singular self is, of course, the cornerstone of Cartesian 
foundationalist epistemology and metaphysics.  Now Nietzsche, as postmodernists rightly 
observe, is a destroyer of all kinds of foundationalisms.  They are right to interpret this as 
the force behind Nietzsche's madman's proclamation of the death of God [GS 125].  It is 
not simply the Christian world-view that is at stake here but all notions of an external 
authority that might provide some ultimate guarantor of beliefs.  But postmodernists are 
wrong to take this rejection of the notion of an external, transcendent authority as a 
rejection of all authority.  The postmodern rejection of all authority, all principle of order 
among the competing modes of representation, presents the very Nihilism that Nietzsche 
predicts, and warns against, as a natural result of the defeat of dogmatism.  For Nietzsche 
there is still room for an immanent authority, an authority that comes from within.  As the 
Nachlass of 1888 reads, 
The multitude and disgregation of impulses and the lack of any systematic order 
among them results in a "weak will"; their coordination under a single 
predominant impulse results in a "strong" will: in the first case it is the oscillation 
and lack of gravity; in the later, the precision and clarity of direction. [KSA, 13, 
394; note 46 of The Will to Power]
It is important to recall that while the madman of section 125 of The Gay Science begins 
with the disappearance and then the death of God he concludes with the suggestion that 
we ourselves, the slayers of God, must become Gods to be worthy of the deed.  The 
importance of the death of God, the ultimate external foundation, is not, primarily, in the 
revealing of a metaphysical or epistemological error; it is in the task it opens up.  We 
must become our own guarantors. 
The problem Nietzsche finds with dogmatism is not that it represents some 
misunderstanding of our true situation.  The problem with dogmatism, including 
Christian dogma, is that in its current form it serves only bad ends "the poisoning, 
slandering, denying or life" [A 56].  The dogma of a pre-given unified self generates 
certain complacency and that is the core of Nietzsche's objection.6  Assuming a world of 
ready-made beings it allows for the suppression of the problem of becoming.  In 
exposing, through genealogy, to what extent our motives are mixed and often beyond our 
understanding Nietzsche is pointing to the conclusion that a creature with a genuine 
center, "an animal with the right to make promises" [GM, II, 1], is something to be 
                                                
6 Here again we can concede that Nietzsche would allow some sympathy for the 
postmodern view of the self, for in rejecting the notion of a pre-given unified soul they at 
least open up the problem of the becoming of the self.
6achieved rather than something to be taken for granted.7 Moreover, claims Nietzsche, it is 
something most humans, mere members of the herd as he is prone to designate them, are 
not capable of fully achieving. 8   To make a promise is to commit one's self for the 
future.  Yet if one has no stable self who is it that is being committed? Consider his 
account of herd man; he is a mere collection of ever fluctuating, competing drives, with 
different drives dominating at different times.  Such an animal cannot take on genuine 
commitments to the future, for such a being has no genuine continuity over time. There is 
little guarantee that the momentary configuration of drives that utter the words of promise 
will continue to exist up to the time when the commitment is to be fulfilled. Most humans 
are bound to be a mere collection of competing drives, as described by Zarathustra:
Motley, all ages and peoples look out of your veils, motley, all customs and faith 
speaks out of your gesture. [TSZ, II, 14]
There is in Zarathustra a pronounced voice that claims that the construction of a genuine, 
that is, unified, self is something yet to be achieved.  Thus he says
And when my eyes flee from the present to the past, it always discovers the same 
thing: fragments and limbs and dreadful chances - but no men! … I walk among 
men as among fragments of the future: of the future which I scan. And it is my art 
and aim, to compose into one and bring together what is fragment and riddle and 
dreadful chance. [TSZ, II, 21]
The theme of modern man as a mere jumble is echoed in Beyond Good and Evil where 
we are told
In the present age human beings have in their bodies the heritage of multiple 
origins, that is opposite and not merely opposite drives and value standards that 
fight each other and rarely permit each other any rest.  Such human beings of late 
cultures and refracted lights will on the average be weaker human beings. [BGE 
                                                
7 While Nietzsche explicitly is proposing a genealogy not of our motives for being 
Christian but a genealogy of the motives of the original slaves who created and embraced 
Christianity, I take it that part of the function of Nietzsche’s Genealogy is to force his 
readers to an act of self-recognition: We moderns are in fact much like the slaves; we 
embrace our current values out of impotence and a desire to justify our mediocrity.  
Indeed we are even less than the slaves since we do not share their creative powers, they 
after all created the values which we now complacently embrace.
8 I interpret Nietzsche's question "To breed an animal with the right to make promises - is 
not this the paradoxical task nature has set itself in the case of man?" to mean that that 
task is yet to be completed.  That we are now, and have long been, capable of making 
promises shows to what extent we have developed beyond mere brutes, thus Nietzsche 
goes on to say that "this problem has been solved to a large extent" [italics mine].  
However to have a full right to make promise, for the problem to be solved in the full, is 
for man to achieve the kind of unified existence that would allow him to stand as a full 
guarantor for the future.
7200]
For "the vast majority who exist for service and the general advantage" [BGE, 61] such 
disunity is inevitable.  What Nietzsche hopes to open up by exposing this disunity is a 
challenge applicable only to a few in each age.  Nietzsche offers such a challenge to those 
few capable of making something of themselves, that is, of making a self of those 
conflicting drives they bodily contain.9  By Nietzsche's high standards not every mere 
human is to count as a genuine person, thus he writes in the Nachlass under the heading 
“The Rank-ordering of Human Values”
(b) one should not at all assume that many humans are "people". Indeed many are 
multiple people, and most are none. Everywhere, where the average qualities that 
are important in order for a kind to continue, overweigh, it would be ludicrous to 
demand a “person.” They are only carriers, transmission-tools.
(c) the “person” a relatively isolated fact; ….the development of a person 
requires isolation, a compulsion to an martial existence, a walling off, a greater 
strength of seclusion: and most of all, a lower degree of impressionability than the 
average human, whose humanity is contagious [KSA, 12, 491, translation mine]10
The potential political ramifications of such a view will be addressed in Section 5 below.
                                                
9 On the view presented here Nietzsche, while generally in favor of multiplicity, is not 
unequivocally for multiplicity.  For some multiplicity of perspectives can be enriching, 
for others it may be debilitating. This, arguably, contrasts with Deleuze's claim that "[t]he 
sense of Nietzsche's philosophy is that multiplicity, becoming and chance are objects of 
pure affirmation" [Deleuze (1983), p. 197]
10  Interestingly the Kaufman-Hollingdale translation reads "One should not assume in 
any case that many men are "personalities" [WP, 886]. In fact Nietzsche's text uses 
"Personen" and not "Persönlichkeiten" or "Personalitäten".  Perhaps this is a deliberate 
attempt by Kaufman-Hollingdale to soften the apparent implications of Nietzsche's text. 
In the section 2 of second Preface to The Gay Science Nietzsche uses the phrase 
“assuming that one is a person” again suggesting that he leaves open the possibility that 
not everyone is to count as a person. One might argue that, since outside of these isolated 
passages Nietzsche does not make such philosophical use of the term “Person”, Nietzsche 
is best presented as recognizing that each biological human is indeed a person though he 
locates value not with mere persons but with higher persons. Besides not gibing with 
those texts cited above, I think this way of presenting things is awkward in that “person’ 
in English and German already has the sense of a positive valuation. We take persons to 
be intrinsically valuable, to have rights.  That is why those who do not have full rights in 
our society, for instance, infants and the insane, are often characterized as not being fully 
persons.  Since Nietzsche rejects the claim that being a mere ordinary human being gives 
one a positive value, gives one rights, he is best presented as denying that every such 
human is a person.  ‘Person’ in English and German is already a term of positive 
normative appraisal and not a merely descriptive term.  Its indiscriminate application to 
all humans implicitly involves values that Nietzsche explicitly rejects.
83. The Architecture of Selbst-Bildung
The creation of a self should not be viewed as a conscious purposive activity -
indeed consciousness is typically viewed by Nietzsche as a weak, irrelevant force, little 
more than an after thought, and typically one that is an agent of, and/or expression of, 
dissipation.11  Rather the reinterpretation of drives, their redirection, is something that 
occurs at a more fundamental level.  Unification is not the result of a conscious subject
pruning an overly luxuriant garden of drives according to some articulate master plan.  
Rather drives come with their own telic structure. In most individuals conflicting drives 
can only express themselves through the repression of other drives.  However in some 
individuals drives form a hierarchy which allows some drives to redirect others so that 
the total can form a concerted singular expression.12  The subject is not one who affects 
this concerted expression, rather he is the result of this expression.  This notion of 
creating a self does not presume some voluntaristic master agent, or master drive, free 
from the constraints of the causal natural order.  Rather it is an extraordinary case within 
the natural order. A striking description of this process occurs in Nietzsche's early essay 
on Wagner, "Richard Wagner in Bayreuth", where he says
The dramatic element in Wagner's development is quite unmistakable from the 
moment when his ruling passion became aware of itself and took his nature in its 
charge: from that time on there was an end to fumbling, straying, to the 
proliferation of secondary shoots, and within the most convoluted courses and 
often daring trajectories assumed by his artistic plans there rules a single inner 
law, a will by which they can be explained. [UM, III, 2] 13
                                                
11 In The Gay Science 354 Nietzsche says
man, like every living creature, thinks unceasingly, but does not know it; the 
thinking which is becoming conscious of itself is only the smallest part thereof, 
we may say, the most superficial part, the worst part.
12 The notion of the Nietzschean individual as a hierarchical organization of drives I take 
from Richardson [1996].  The idea of the self as an achievement is given its clearest and 
most sustained expression in Nehamas (1985) where he says, for instance, 
But a person worthy of admiration, a person who has (or is) a self, is one whose 
thoughts, desires, and actions are not haphazard but are instead connected to one 
another in the intimate way that indicates in all cases the presence of style. 
[(1995) p. 7- emphasis mine]
and later
The unity of the self, which therefore also constitutes its identity, is not something 
given but something achieved [p. 182]
To some degree it may be said that Richardson in his account of the Overman (see below) 
gives a naturalistic reading of the connectedness and unity that Nehamas is here 
concerned with.  
13 Of course Nietzsche would latter take a less favorable view of Wagner.  One hopes that 
this change of opinion was partially produced by his reading of Wagner's deplorable 
9The story of Wagner’s achievement of a higher unity borne from some unconscious drive 
is of course the story Nietzsche would repeat about himself in the dramatic section of 
Ecce Homo where Nietzsche elaborates the subtitle of that work “How One Becomes 
What One Is”:
To become what one is, one must not have the slightest notion of what one is… 
The whole surface of consciousness – consciousness is a surface – must be kept 
clear of all great imperatives…Meanwhile the organizing “idea” that is destined 
to rule keeps growing deep down – it begins to command; slowly it leads us back
from side roads and wrong roads; it prepares single qualities and fitnesses that 
will one day prove to be indispensable as a means towards the whole – one by 
one, it trains all subservient capacities before giving any hint of the dominant 
task, “goal”, “aim”, or “meaning”. [EH, Why I am So Clever, 9]]
Various factors, "internal" and "external", may explain what activates, or strengthens, a 
drive to engage in this hierarchical organizing of other drives.  One possible influence is 
the reading of texts, the exposure to various examples.  Thus Schopenhauer was such an 
influence on Wagner and both Wagner and Schopenhauer similarly influenced Nietzsche 
himself. Indeed this question of influence to some degree explains why Nietzsche often 
writes and claims to write in styles and fashions that attempt to move his select readers in 
ways much deeper than that of mere conscious recognition. Nietzsche hopes himself to be 
a catalyst for his more gifted readers.  But these are matters beyond the scope of the 
present work.14
This idea of an organizing master drive does not sit well with Lyotard's characterization, 
noted in the opening quotation of this essay, of the postmodern as a disbelief in meta-
narratives.  Now the typical function of meta-narratives is to give a sense of individuation 
and order, a teleology, the very thing provided by the Nietzschean idea of a non-
conscious master drive. For Lyotard's postmodern man there are but a series of language 
games, which have no external end or principle of order and which can be combined and 
recombined in various arbitrary ways.  Following Lyotard, theorists of postmodern 
architecture such as Vidler and Kolb, claim that our awareness of the historical 
contingency of our various language games, our realization that they lack any 
transcendental grounding, has left us with an ironical stance towards the various games, 
the various genres initiated by our more naive predecessors.  Kolb, citing Lyotard, posits 
this ironical stance as initiating a new sense of freedom and playfulness,
for Lyotard our age is losing the total meanings characteristic of both the tradition 
and modernity.  The central self is a myth and its pure rationality gives way to a 
                                                                                                                                                
"Judaism in Music".  I have been unable to find definitive archival evidence that 
Nietzsche read that piece, though SB, 4, 38 strongly suggests he had read it.  For more on 
Nietzsche and Wagner see Urs Marti (1993).  It is Urs who directed me to SB, 4, 38.
14 For more on this see Gemes (1992) section 6 and 7, and especially the excellent chapter 
1 of Nehamas (1985).
10
diversity of language games and practices that are irreducible to each other.  Amid 
this plurality we should play our games lightly, ironically, inventing new rules as 
we go.  No one game can define us and there is no pure meta-game above them 
all.  [Kolb, 1990, p.100]15
The language of Kolb here deliberately echoes Nietzschean descriptions of free spirits. 
However Lyotard’s and Kolb’s rejection of unity and their insistence on a hyper-self-
conscious control of the various language games and hence ironical distance from one's 
own projects is the antithesis of Nietzsche’s idea of self-formation under a unifying 
subconscious will.  While Nietzschean free spirits are, like Lyotard’s postmodern men,
free of the constraints of received essentialist dogma, be it Christian, socialist, Cartesian, 
whatever, this is not to say that they are free of the constraint of a self imposed form.  
Their play is the serious play of self-creation.
In understanding the distinction between Nietzsche's rejection of a 
foundationalist, essentialist metaphysics and the postmodernist rejection of the notion of 
a unified self it is helpful to consider Derrida's attempted renovation of the notion of the 
feminine within Nietzsche's work.16 Derrida in Spurs correctly notes that Nietzsche 
attempts a positive re-evaluation of the figure of woman by configuring her as an anti-
essentialist who has forgone the transcendentalist longing for a deep and abiding 
permanent truth and learned to revel in the world of mere appearances; this is woman as 
the embodiment of free spirits. Here Nietzsche has taken the traditional misogynist 
charge that woman has no essence, no soul, no permanent unchanging core, and given it a 
positive valorization.  However Derrida remains silent on, though presumably not 
ignorant of, the fact that while Nietzsche celebrates this anti-essentialist configuration of 
the feminine he echoes the traditional charge that woman is a mere collection of 
appearances lacking any attempt at developing an even immanent principle of order.  The 
point here is that a celebration of freedom from the stultifying constraints of essentialist 
metaphysics need not be identified as valorization of total disorder.
Nietzsche's essay "On the Use and Abuse of History for Life", the second of his 
Untimely Meditations is primarily a warning against such mislocated conceptions of 
freedom.  For Nietzsche this type of historical, ironical sensibility divorced from any 
                                                
15 In a similar vein Vidler characterizes Foucault and Barthes as being "sensitive to the 
world after Nietzsche" and thus opening  "the possibility of what one might call a 
"restricted modernism"".  Vidler concludes
Such a restrained art, conscious of its loss of positive ground and yet intimately 
aware of its own procedures, is bound to speak, even though its results are not 
only unpredictable but also impossible to endow with any unitary purpose. [Vidler 
(1992), p. 196]
16 At its simplest the received view that Nietzsche (and postmodernists) reject is 
foundationalist and essentialist in the sense that it supposes that all values and existence 
ultimately rest on the existence of God and takes a things value to be determined by its 
unchanging intrinsic proprieties not in its worldly relations.  However, save for 
considerations of space, a lot more could be said here.
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teleological drive, leaves us with a mere overwhelming sense of the accomplishments of 
the past with no sense of the possibility of having our own distinct voice and destiny, 
condemned to see ourselves as epigones free of the very illusions that gave our ancestors 
their creative vitality.  
Close behind the pride of modern man there stands his ironic view of himself, his 
awareness that he has to live in an historicizing twilight mood. [UM, II, 7]
In this vein we become for Nietzsche "men of learning, the exhausted hens" [UM, II, 7] 
whose "buildings are carted together not constructed." [UM, II, 7]
The negative metaphor of the building as a decentered collection, as a mere 
assemblage of disparate materials lacking and unifying plan or form runs counter to the 
whole postmodern appropriation of Nietzsche.  It runs counter to the postmodern 
configuration of Nietzsche as a prophet of an architecture of bricolage, the ironical 
assembling of mannered references to past genres and forms, championed by Kolb in 
particular.  For Nietzsche the strength to achieve a natural unity, an organizing force 
within the competing drives, is a precondition for the appearance of genuine subjects, 
genuine cultures; "true culture must in any event presuppose unity of style" [UM, I, 2].  
Where Kolb celebrates the notion of unrestrained pluralism, Nietzsche observes "In the 
end modern man drags around with him a huge quantity of indigestible stones" [UM, II, 
4].  Such beings, for Nietzsche "resemble a field of ruins" [UM, III, 6].  It is the lack of 
integration that leads Nietzsche in the same place to claim "our modern culture.... is no 
real culture" and later to contrast our present situation with the ancient Greeks with the 
observation that "Hellenic culture was no mere aggregate.... The Greeks gradually 
learned to organize the chaos"  [UM, II, 10].17
Indeed Nietzsche offers a diagnosis of the ironical stance and suggests remedies 
by which it might be overcome.   Rather than being overwhelmed by our own historical 
contingency, Nietzsche counsels that we would do better to forget the past and cultivate 
"the art and power of forgetting" [UM, II, 10].  This art of forgetting is not for Nietzsche 
the only alternative; it is that suggested for those who simply do not have the will to 
master the past and employ it to their own purposes.  Stronger natures, including 
                                                
17 The reader may have noted that in the above paragraph unity is extolled, on Nietzsche's 
behalf, as a condition for "genuine subjects" and "real culture".  The issue of the relations 
between conditions for culture and for genuine subjects is a complex issue that we can 
not get into here.  However it is worth noting that Nietzsche himself often puts the two 
issues together in the context of extolling the importance of unity, for instance, in the 
section of  Human All Too Human entitled "Microcosm and Macrocosm of Culture" 
where he again takes up the architectural metaphoric to say
Such a cultural edifice in the single individual will have the greatest similarity to 
the cultural architecture of whole eras …. For wherever the great architecture of 
culture developed, it was its  task to force opposing forces into harmony through 
an overwhelming aggregation of the remaining, less incompatible, powers, yet 
without suppressing or shackling them. [HAH, 276]
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Nietzsche himself we may suppose, may acknowledge the accomplishments of the past 
while interpreting them as preconditions for their own form of self-expression.  Thus 
when "the experienced and superior man" writes history then  
When the past speaks it always speaks as an oracle: only if you are an architect of 
the future and know the present will you understand it ... only he who constructs 
the future has the right to judge the past.  If you look ahead and set yourself a 
great goal, you at the same time restrain that rank analytical impulse which makes 
the present a desert ... Form within yourself an image to which the future will 
correspond and forget the supposition that you are epigones. [UM, II, 6].
Nietzsche's architectural metaphoric of modern man as a mere building carted 
together, in fact as a kind of ruin, his vision of the architect of the future as one who 
constructs a unifying goal, as one who puts the various pieces into a highly structured 
whole under a singular vision, runs counter to the whole postmodern appropriation of 
Nietzsche as celebrating a fragmentary decentered world.18
In the famous passage in The Gay Science, GS 290, where Nietzsche talks of the grand 
and rare art of giving style to one's character, he again contrasts those whose nature 
fashions itself "into an ingenious plan", who administer control "when they have palaces 
to build and gardens to lay out" with those "weak characters who have no power over 
themselves, and hate the restriction of style", those whose creations are inevitably "wild, 
arbitrary, fantastic, confusing and surprising". Here, in characterizing those strong 
natures Nietzsche invokes the notion of a second nature being added while a portion of 
first nature has been taken away.  This again brings us to the point, mentioned at the end 
of the last section, that for Nietzsche the conception of a created unity is thoroughly 
naturalistic and does not presume the notion of a conscious supra-natural agency. 
Nietzsche's attack on the notion of the Cartesian self is an attack on the notion of a 
transcendental unity existing outside of the natural causal order.
                                                
18 Interestingly, the well known architectural critic Kenneth Frampton, in his classic  
Modern Architecture; A critical History offers the following criticism of post-modernist 
architecture,
In Post-modern architecture classical and vernacular 'quotations' tend to 
interpenetrate each other disconcertingly. Invariably rendered as unfocused 
images, they easily disintegrate and mix with other ...forms, for which the 
architect has no more respect than for his arbitrary historical allusions. [(1992), p. 
307]
Summing up postmodern architecture he concludes
the result is an inconclusive and seemingly pointless 'cacophony' in which the 
architect loses control of his material. [ibid., p. 308]
These words are a, presumably, non-deliberate but near exact echo of Nietzschean 
sentiments.
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4. Foucault's Reading of "The Use and Abuse of History for Life"
We have so far concentrated on Nietzsche's emphasis, in the second of the 
Untimely Meditations, on the importance of unity for the construction a true culture, a 
true self.  Interestingly in his essay "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" Foucault takes up 
that very essay to emphasize Nietzsche's use of genealogy to disrupt the notion of a 
unified self;
The search for descent is not the erecting of foundations: on the contrary, it 
disturbs what was previously considered immobile; it fragments what was thought 
unified; it shows the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself. 
[Foucault (1997) p.147)] 
Moreover, Foucault does not simply intend this as a descriptive account of the effects of 
genealogy but also seeks to endorse this use of history by labeling it as effective history,
History becomes "effective" to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our 
very being - as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our 
body and sets it against itself.  "Effective" history deprives the self of the 
reassuring stability of life and nature ... It will uproot its traditional foundation 
and relentlessly disrupt its pretended continuity [ibid. p. 154.]
This account and endorsement of the use of historical genealogical investigations, of 
course, well expresses Foucault's own use of genealogy in such works as The Birth of the 
Clinic, "What is an author", and the first volume of The History of Sexuality.19
Furthermore, it does indeed capture the use that Nietzsche puts genealogy to in On the 
Genealogy of Morals.20  
How then are we to reconcile the use of history to construct a unitary coherent 
narrative, as described in our reading of the second of the Untimely Meditations, with the 
use of history in the On the Genealogy of Morals to disrupt unitary apparently coherent 
narratives?  
The difference in emphasis between Nietzsche's Untimely Meditations and the 
                                                
19 While the early Foucault can with some accuracy be characterized as valorizing the 
dispersion of the subject, the late Foucault, for instance, the author of the second and 
third volumes of The History of Sexuality is more sympathetic to the possibility of a new 
notion of the subject/self.  These are complex matters that we cannot enter into here.
20 However the term “effective” is Foucault’s not Nietzsche’s.  Nietzsche in GM, Preface, 
7, the passage cited by Foucault, in fact writes of  “wirklichen Historie der Moral” which 
is better translated as “real history of morals”.  “Effective history” has the suggestion of 
history as a mere rhetorical tool for effecting certain goals.  “Real history” has more the 
suggestion of a genuine expose of deep motivations. This little question of translation to 
some extent reflects the fault-line between modernist and post-modernists interpretations 
of Nietzsche.
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Genealogy is part of a marked difference between his concern with the notion of unity in 
the  early works such as "The Use and Abuse of History for Life" and the Birth of 
Tragedy and his concern with the notion of unity in the later works.  Indeed it is striking 
to note that after his repeated use of 'Einheit' [unity] in the early works there is a dramatic 
fall-off in the number of uses of that term as the years progress till the period of the later 
works where its use undergoes a marked revival.21  In the early works 'Einheit' is used 
often, and nearly invariably in a positive way. In the later works it is used sparingly and 
nearly always in a negative way.  It might be tempting then to claim that the positive 
account of unity stressed here corresponds to an emphasis on his early works while the 
postmodern stress on Nietzsche as a champion of disunity corresponds to an emphasis on 
his later work.  On this line one would have to accept that Nietzsche over the years 
changed his mind about the value of unity.  
One problem with this interpretation is that even the later texts generally valorizes 
unity.22  However the more serious failing of this line is that it misses a fundamental shift 
in Nietzsche's use of the term 'Einheit'.   It is a shift in reference rather than a shift in 
value.  To understand this shift we must take into account the difference in the targets of 
Nietzsche's works. 
In the Untimely Meditations and, albeit, to a lesser extent, in the other of his early 
works, for instance The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche is addressing the problem of the last 
Man and the Age of Nihilism. It is a work primarily directed at overcoming Nihilism.  
That this Nihilism is only just coming to fruition, that Nihilism is his  projection for the 
immediate future of Europe once the death of God has been fully absorbed explains why 
the mediations are labeled "Untimely".  Nietzsche claims to have not only seen the 
inevitable future; the Age of Nihilism, but is already suggesting a remedy to overcome 
that future. In these works of the early period and the corresponding Nachlass 'Einheit' is 
used in a positive sense with the contrast being primarily between the unity of style 
achieved by the classical Greeks and the disunity and hence lack of culture that 
characterizes the present age.  This we have already seen in our analysis of the second of 
the Untimely Meditations.  This is echoed in Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks;
A time which suffers from so-called general education but has no culture and no 
unity of style in its life can make no real use of philosophy even if it were 
proclaimed by the genius of truth in the street and the marketplace.  In such a time 
                                                
21  While this is true of the published works it is even more striking in the Nachlass.  For 
instance, in the Nachlass from 69-72 the term 'Einheit' occurs 50 times in a text of 
approximately 93,000 words; in the Nachlass of  80-81 it occurs 5 times in a text of 
approximately 100,000 word;  and in the Nachlass of  88-89 it occurs 17 times in a text 
of approximately 100,000 words.
22   For instance note 46 from the Will to Power quoted above is from 1888 and the 
positive characterization of Zarathustra "in him all opposites are blended into a higher 
unity" quoted below is from the 1888 work Ecco Homo. Note while it is claimed here that 
he continues to valorize unity as a goal we shall soon see that he rejects certain false 
notions of unity and this rejection comes to dominate his use of the term 'Einheit'.
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philosophy remains a learned monologue of the solitary walker, accidental loot of 
individuals, secret of the recluse, or inconsequential gossip between academic
geese and children. [KSA, vol.1, p.812 - my translation]
 On The Genealogy of Morals  (1887), like many of Nietzsche's later works, 
including the 1886 Beyond Good and Evil and the 1888 Antichrist, aims, primarily, at 
disrupting the Judeo-Christian heritage. This heritage remains at the core of European 
thought, even in its modern secular mode where the Christian ascetic ideal continues with 
the worship of truth as an end in itself being substituted for prostration before God.23  The 
construction of a narrative which serves to expose the disunity of repressed motives 
(envy of, and desire to destroy, the healthy and strong) and the expressed philosophy (of 
love and humility) in the Judeo-Christian world-view helps subvert the grip of that view. 
The true destruction of that world-view would pave the way for the advent of Nihilism.  
On the Genealogy of Morals is one of Nietzsche's works which paves the way for the 
new Age of Nihilism and the Last Man.24 In this destructive mode Nietzsche typically 
uses 'Einheit' to refer, disparagingly, to the Cartesian notion of a transcendental unified 
soul or self possessed of free will.  Nietzsche's aim here is to bring his audience to realize 
that there is no such unified Cartesian self and hence the construction of a self is a task 
for the future.25  Hence he disparages the presumed unity that the Cartesian philosophy so 
                                                
23 Put simply, the worship of truth is the secular substitute for the worship of God in that 
in both cases the value for life is not given primary importance.  More deeply, both 
represent a kind of transcendental longing, a desire to escape involvement in this world.  
The Christian escapes this world by postulating a more important world to come, the 
worshiper of truth similarly takes the position of being above the mere fray of worldly 
involvement, he digs past mere appearances to the ultimate truth.  The unconditional 
desire to understand the true order of things is, for Nietzsche, a form of revenge taken by 
the weak against a world that resists their desires. This is true of both the Christian 
ascetic and his modern ascetic counterpart the secular scientist.  This is the point of 
Nietzsche’s claim in the third essay of the Genealogy
These two, science and the ascetic ideal, they do, stand on the same ground … 
namely on the same overestimation of truth. [GM, III, 25]
24  This is not to say that the advent of Nihilism is Nietzsche’s ultimate aim.  The point is 
that Nietzsche claims that nihilism is the inevitable first result of a full recognition of the 
death of God.  It is a precondition for the inventing of new values:
Why has the advent of nihilism become necessary? Because the values we have 
had hitherto thus draw their final consequence…We require, sometime, new 
values. [KSA, vol. 13, p. 190]
25 That the construction of an authentic self is a task for the future is most eloquently, 
though elliptically, expressed in the famous “God is dead” passage of The Gay Science, 
GS 125.  There Nietzsche’s madman accuses his audience of not understanding the true 
meaning of the death of God, namely the collapse of all hitherto accepted values, and 
after posing the fateful question “Must we ourselves not become Gods [i.e. authors of our 
own values] to appear worthy of it?” answers “I have come to early”.  This is of a piece 
with Nietzsche’s awareness that he is “untimely” and that the perhaps he will be “born 
posthumously”.
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unquestioningly assumes. The most direct examples of Nietzsche using the term 'Einheit' 
to refer to what he takes to be a mythological Cartesian subject occur in the Nachlass
from 1888, which contain such notes as
The monstrous false concepts:
    (1) the senseless overvaluation of consciousness, a unity made of it, a being,    
"the spirit", "the soul", that feels, that thinks [KSA, 13, 330 - translation 
mine]
and 
(b) The false unity "soul", "I", " person",
       even more "eternal person"  [KSA, 13, 593 - translation mine]
Indeed already by the time of The Gay Science Nietzsche was attacking this false notion 
of a unified consciousness and hinting that genuine consciousness is something that we 
may in a slow process of maturation acquire in the future.  Thus he says
Consciousness is the last and latest development of the organic, and hence what is 
most unfinished and unstrong…. One thinks it constitutes the kernel of man; what 
is abiding, eternal, ultimate, and most original in him. One takes consciousness 
for determined magnitude, one denies its growth and its intermittences. One takes 
it for the "unity of the organism.
This ridiculous overestimation of consciousness has the very useful 
consequence that it prevents an all too fast development of consciousness. 
Believing that they posses consciousness, men have not exerted themselves very 
much to acquire it. [GS,1,12]
As noted above, the problem with the notion of a unified free Cartesian soul is not that it 
is a metaphysical error but that it covers up the problem of becoming.26  This is clearly 
expressed in the Nachlass of 1885 where he says,
To indulge the fable of "unity", "soul", "person", this we have forbidden with such 
hypotheses one only cover-up the problem [KSA, 11, 577 - my translation].
If this interpretation of the difference of reference between Nietzsche's early and 
                                                
26  Generally, Nietzsche presents himself as an advocate of becoming while 
characterizing his enemies as advocates of being.  This covers a complex set of issues.  
Part of what is at stake is Nietzsche’s sense that philosophy should be striving not to 
describe the world but to shape it. Also it adverts to his sense that the value and meaning, 
of a thing is to be found in its historical relations, it causes and effects, not in its intrinsic 
properties. For Nietzsche the being/becoming dichotomy is closely related to the 
reality/appearance and permanence/change dichotomies.  Where traditional philosophy 
privileges the first term in each of these three dichotomies Nietzsche champions the 
second. At his most grandiose he characterizes this as the battle between the Crucifed and 
Dionysus [EH, Why I am A Destiny, 9].  These themes are dealt with at grater length in 
Gemes (1992).
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later uses of the term 'Einheit' is right, then the message of the early works is really one 
that can only be absorbed after one has digested the message of the later works. The need 
to bring unity to our lives that is so pronounced in the early works can only be 
appreciated if one has already accepted the message of the later works that our 
complacent assumption of the unity of the Cartesian I is an error.  Here I think we see the 
common maturing process of an author with a revolutionary agenda.  In his early works 
he takes his audience to realize the basic problems he is addressing and proposes his 
various solutions.  As he matures he realizes that others do not heed his message because 
they have not even come to realize the problem at hand and so are not ready to hear his 
solutions.  He then engages the assumptions that have made the problem inaccessible to 
his audience.  As Nietzsche matured he came to believe that our deeply held Judeo-
Christian values prevented us from seeing the malaise at the heart of our modern 
"culture".  Thus he came to polemicize in an ever more strident fashion against that 
heritage. In the early works where he takes his audience to have some awareness of the 
problems of our times he holds unity as a possibility for our future and hence uses 
'Einheit' to denote a positive value.  In the later works where he has realized his audience 
does not understand the basic problems of the times he attacks their assumption that they 
already have a unified self. Here 'Einheit' is used in a negative fashion.
The postmodernists who take Nietzsche disparaging comments about unity as an 
endorsement of a decentered pluralism have mistaken the target of Nietzsche's polemic. 
He is not against unity but rather wants to expose our lack of unity by exposing the myth 
of the Cartesian unified self.  Throughout Nietzsche's works unity remains a goal 
however his use of the term 'Einheit' shifts its reference as he comes to understand the 
immensity of his own task.  Before he can construct an ideal of the future unified active 
self of the Overman he must destroy the idol of the unified Cartesian self.
5. The Politics of Estheticism
Is there a reason why the postmodernists have overlooked the side of Nietzsche 
that emphasizes the positive construction of a new unified self?  Perhaps in some cases 
they are well aware of the difference between the Overman and the Last Man but have 
chosen to deliberately ignore Nietzsche's suggestions for the overcoming of Nihilism.27
 When we consider the uses that Nietzsche has been put to I think we can discern 
a possible motive for such a, possibly deliberate, oversight.
In the light of the events of the 20th century, the reading of Nietzsche I have been 
offering, centering on the notion of a unified architectonic of the self, suggests a dubious, 
indeed, offensive social politic.  We saw above that Nietzsche's concept of what it is to 
                                                
27 I think this is particularly true for Derrida and perhaps also for Foucault.
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have a genuine self, to be a person, carries with it the consequence that most mere 
humans do not count as having a self, of being persons.  His valorization of the creation 
of genuine selves and his emphasis on unity as a condition for the emergence of a self 
may seem to suggest that forces that threaten such unity need to be isolated and 
repressed.  Projected from the case of the individual to the body politic, to the question of 
culture, which, as we have already noted, Nietzsche himself was inclined to do, this is but 
one step from the most disastrous paranoid fantasies.  The idea that a genuine culture 
must incorporate some organic unity can easily seem to lend support to the conclusion 
that in order to achieve such a unity foreign elements must be exorcised.  
It is here worth noting that Nietzsche's advocacy of unity in culture and his 
identification of culture with architecture was mirrored in his fascist appropriation.  Both 
Italian and German fascists of the 20th century literally and metaphorically saw 
themselves as architects of the future; thus their emphasis on monumental architecture 
and their talk of constructing a new man. 
There are a number of ways of answering the charge that Nietzsche is paving the 
way for a fascist aesthetics.  I will here consider two.
  First, what this type of extrapolation misses is that Nietzsche's invocation of the 
notion of unity never indulges in the nostalgic moment, the invocation of a lost purity.  
Nietzsche rejects the romantic notion that we were at one time whole but now are 
sundered.  Indeed, Nietzsche radically reverses the temporality of unity; where romantics 
typically locate unity in the past, thus Mussolini spoke of recapturing the glory of the 
Roman empire and the Renascence and Hitler longed for a return to purity of the original 
Aryan race,  Nietzsche posits unity as a possible future achievement.  The Nietzsche of 
The Gay Science is careful to say, "[w]e conserve nothing neither do we want to return to 
any past periods" [GS 377]. 28
Second, and most importantly, this interpretation is for Nietzsche fundamentally 
mistaken in its model of health. His model of health is not that of a pure being free of all 
external contamination.  Rather, his model of health is of one who has been thoroughly 
contaminated by a myriad of influences, a myriad of strong challenges but has managed 
to make something out of those challenges.  Nineteenth Century post-Darwinian social 
scientists and Kulturkritiker tended to entertain biologistic models of individual and 
cultural development.  Certain elements of society could thus be nominated as virulent 
strains that need to be isolated and controlled.29 The dominant metaphoric here is that of 
contamination and infection, the ideal state being one of pure health, free of diseased 
influences.  While Nietzsche participates in this biologistic rhetoric, he rejects the 
metaphysics of purity.  For Nietzsche this kind of purity is a total impoverishment that 
                                                
28 There are of  course deeply romantic strains in Nietzsche's thought, for instance his 
emphasis on genius, creativity and nature.  For more on this very complex topic see Del 
Cario [1989]
29 These ideas are suggested, either explicitly or implicitly, in the works such writers as 
Lombrosso, Morel, Gobineau, Vogt, Nordau and, arguably, even Darwin himself.
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precludes the conditions of true health, namely, genuine challenges which are not to be 
simply defeated by extirpation but overcome through incorporation into a higher unity. 
This is the point behind Nietzsche's famous dictum "What does not kill me makes me 
stronger".
Indeed Nietzsche is near unique in claiming that degeneration is in fact a 
precondition of progress.30  Thus in Human, All too Human, in a passage headed by the 
title "Ennoblement through degeneration", he writes,
Precisely at this wounded weakened place, the common body is inoculated, so to 
speak, with something new; however the community's strength must be great 
enough to take this new thing into its bloodstream and assimilate it.  Every 
progress of the whole must be proceeded by a partial weakening…. Something is 
similar also happens in the individual…. it must be possible to attain higher goals 
when the degenerating natures partially weaken or wound the stable power; it is 
precisely the weaker nature, as more delicate and free, that makes progress 
possible at all.  If a people starts to crumble and grow weak at some one place, but 
is still strong and healthy in general, it can accept being infected with something 
new, and can incorporate it to its advantage. [HAH, 224]
Yet, whatever Nietzsche's intentions, his use of the biologistic rhetoric of unity, 
coupled with his talk of infections and degeneration found a sinister echo in the rhetoric 
of German National Socialism and Italian Fascism.  I suspect this is one of the main 
reasons postmodernists have been loath to acknowledge that Nietzschean voice which so 
positively valorizes unity.  The affinity to fascist esthetics makes that voice unacceptable 
to readers who lay claim to the title of being Nietzsche's heirs.  Consider the following 
passage from Beyond Good and Evil where Nietzsche excoriates the Europeans of his 
day,
In the new generation, that as it were, has inherited in its blood diverse standards 
and values, everything is unrest, disturbance, doubt, attempt; the best forces have 
an inhibiting effect, the very virtues do not allow each other to grow and become 
strong; balance, a center of gravity and perpendicular poise are lacking in body 
and soul.  But what becomes sickest and degenerates most in such hybrids is the 
will.[BGE 208]
This is followed by the ominous prediction 
The time for petty politics is over: the very next century will bring the fight for 
domination of the earth - the compulsion to large scale politics. [BGE 208]
Here the talk of the lack of center of gravity is chillingly coupled with talk of the 
apparently degenerative effects of the mixing of blood and an apparently approving 
                                                
30 In my forthcoming book The Biology of Evil I argue that Baudelaire and, to some 
extent, Freud share Nietzsche's notion of health through infection.
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prediction of some future large scale fight for domination.  After the cataclysmic events 
of this century it is of little wonder that this is a side of Nietzsche that many would be 
disciples are not keen on emphasizing.  
Of course, Nietzsche, as noted above, often extols the mixing of diverse strains. 
Indeed one may argue that the passage just quoted is not arguing against all such mixing 
but rather pointing out some of its effects in current Europe.  His point being that in weak 
vessels such mixing can have deleterious effects.  While Nietzsche scholars may believe 
that his many positive accounts of mixtures, his continual disparagement of German 
nationalism and his many positive comments about Jews, exonerate him from 
responsibility for the crudest readings of the above type passages, I think those who take  
seriously Nietzsche's dictum that "a thing is the sum of its effects" and understand how 
destructive the biologistic rhetoric of degeneration has been for Europe will find little 
solace here. To this extent I sympathize with the postmodernists repression of this aspect 
of Nietzsche.31
6. Slave, Master, Last Man, Overman
John Richardson in his excellent Nietzsche's System uses the model of strength 
through incorporation of diverse elements to explain Nietzsche's slave-master-overman 
typology.  Richardson, while noting that Nietzsche clearly admires the masters for their 
ability to immediately discharge their instincts in action, their ability to avoid the 
repression that leads to ressentiment, makes the traditional gesture of pointing out that he 
also admires the slaves for the formative power that issues from their repression of desire 
for immediate gratification.  Thus the Genealogy tells us,
It is under the slave revolt that "man first became an interesting animal" [GM, I, 
6.] 
and
Human history would be altogether too stupid a thing without the spirit the 
impotent have introduced into it. [GM, I, 7]
Altogether, the slave is seen as a much richer more complex psychological type then the 
master - and for Nietzsche, most pointedly, this cleverness, does not preclude creativity.  
It is worth briefly noting that here again Nietzsche takes a common 19th Century 
metaphoric and gives it a positive reading - recall our discussion of Nietzsche's valuative 
                                                
31 Nietzsche on degeneration, like Nietzsche on Jews (see below) and Nietzsche on 
woman, is a fascinating and extremely complicated topic. Particularly fascinating is his 
tendency in all three cases to indulge the rhetoric of his day yet give it a radical re-
evaluation, characterizing alleged weakness as a kind of strength. These topics will be 
dealt with in more detail in my forthcoming book The Biology of Evil.
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inversion of the traditional negative metaphoric of woman as lacking depth, as lacking 
essence, as being wholly inscribed within the world of appearances.   While Nietzsche 
indulges the traditional metaphoric of the slave, and in particular the Jew, as castrated, he 
points to this castration as the source of a deep form of creativity. Were the Jews 
cleverness was typically configured as a kind of reflective unoriginal intelligence, 
Nietzsche claims that Jewish cleverness is a manifestation of a source of deep 
originality.32
      On this model it is clear why Nietzsche harbors no real longing for a return to the 
world of the masters. He finds the return to such simple, uncomplicated natures both 
impossible and undesirable.  Richardson suggestion is that Nietzsche's Overman 
represents a synthesis of the slave and master.  The slave has complexity, a myriad, of 
competing drives, including a drive for the very successes achieved by the master, as well 
as a drive to denigrate those successes beyond his reach.  The master has a rigid 
simplicity of drives which allows for their singular expression in action, actions which 
inevitably reflects the simplicity of their origin.  Faced with an opposing view the master 
does not try to understand it, incorporate it, he merely fails to recognize it, or, should it 
prove a genuine obstacle, he takes up arms against it.33
      The Overman, or “higher” Man, is one who contains all the complexity of the slave 
but has managed to integrate that complexity into an active whole.34 Faced with the 
                                                
32 That the homeless "castrated" Jew should be creative runs counter to that old German 
"Blut und Boden" saw, "Wir [the Germans] haben Kultur. Sie [the Jews] haben nur 
Civilization". Indeed, Nietzsche claims that Christian culture is the invention of the Jews 
at their most creative, and that actual Christians are merely the Jews' sterile inheritors.  It 
is worth pondering the irony in the fact that Nietzsche runs the line, roughly, that there 
was only one truly creative Christian and that was the Jew Paul, while Freud, in some 
ways an inheritor of Nietzsche (for instance, both take repression as a primal cause of 
creativity), runs the line, roughly, that there was only one truly creative Jew and that was 
Moses, who according to Freud was an Egyptian non-Jew (see Freud's Moses and 
Monotheism).  Such grandiose claims from two of the founding fathers of "the 
hermeneutics of suspicion"!
33 Recall Odysseus's response to the foot soldier Thersites who complains that he has no 
stake, or interest in fighting the Trojans.  Odysseus does not consider the soldier's, by our 
lights, reasonable view.  He does not attempt to reason with him but simply beats him 
into submission.  The foot soldier, for Odysseus, is merely a tool, like his trusty sword, 
and when it performs other than to specifications, he corrects it accordingly.
34 Brian Leiter in his forthcoming Nietzsche on Morality argues that generally we do 
better do talk of the higher man rather than the Übermensch since the later notion is 
specific to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, while talk of the higher man is repeated throughout 
Nietzsche’s work.  However until the notion of higher man is given a concrete 
characterization which reveals how it is different from the as yet equally ephemeral 
notion of Übermensch I see no problem in simply equating the two. Übermensch seems 
more descriptive since it has the helpful suggestion of a feat of overcoming.
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inevitability of conflicting drives he does not suppress, or seek to extirpate any drive, this 
being the typical genesis of ressentiment, but rather he achieves a redirection of various 
drives. In support of Richardson's notion of the Overman as the ideal of a Hegelian 
Aufhebung of the master-slave dichotomy we should note that in the very place where 
Nietzsche first introduces the terms "slave morality" and "master morality", namely BGE 
260, he says "in all higher and more mixed cultures there also appears an attempt at 
mediation between these two moralities".  In Human, All too Human he writes,
For wherever the great architecture of culture developed, it was its task to force 
opposing forces into harmony, through an overwhelming aggregation of the 
remaining, less incompatible powers, yet without suppressing or shackling them. 
[HAH 276]
On this model the Overman is a complete construction, a building of hierarchical 
forms, containing diverse elements structured towards a unitary goal.  As Nietzsche says 
of Zarathustra in Ecce Homo, "in him all opposites are blended into a new unity" [EH, 
p303].  Nietzsche's Overman, unlike the Last Man, is no mere assemblage of disparate 
pieces carted together.  His understanding of the past does not indulge in the dogmatist's 
refuge in some transcendental authority; the will of God, progress towards the summum 
bonum.  Nor is it a product of the nihilist's ironic distance from his own projects.  Rather 
he respects the past for the individuals it has achieved and for providing the materials 
from which his new subjectivity has been fashioned. For Nietzsche, where the Overman 
is a labyrinth whose center is everywhere and circumference nowhere, The Last Man, his 
prescient prefiguration of postmodern man, is a labyrinth whose center is nowhere and 
circumference  everywhere.35
                                                                                                                                                
overcoming. Indeed in the those passages where Nietzsche refers both to higher men and 
Übermensch, for instance, KSA, vol. 13, p. 190, he seem to pretty much equate the two.
35 This article has greatly improved through  feedback from Pia Conti, Brian Leiter, Peter 
Levine, John Richardson, and Chris Williams.  The enormous influence of my teacher 
Alexander Nehamas I take to be too obvious to detail.  This essay is dedicated to the two 
other Alexanders in my life, my father Alexander Gemes who, as much as anyone I have 
ever known, struggled heroically with the problem of making a self of his many 
conflicting drives, and my son Alexander Conti-Gemes who I hope will succeed where 
his grandfather failed.
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